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CAROLINE REVISITED:

AN IMAGINED EXCHANGE BETWEEN
JOHN KERRY AND MOHAMMAD JAVAD
ZARIF
James W. Houck*
“If you have remonstrated for some time without
effect and see no prospect of relief, when begins your
right to defend yourself?”1
Lord Ashburton,
British Minister in America,
July 8, 1842
I. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY STANDARD
Late in the evening of December 29, 1837, a band of British
officers conducted a bold raid on the American merchant vessel
Caroline, which was moored on the Niagara River near Buffalo, New
York. After wounding several and killing an American citizen named
Amos Durfee, the British set the Caroline ablaze, and then adrift.
Shortly thereafter, she went over Niagara Falls to a violent demise.
* James W. Houck, Interim Dean and Distinguished Scholar in Residence,
Dickinson School of Law and School of International Affairs, Pennsylvania State
University.
1 See Letter from the British Minister to the United States Lord Alexander
Baring Ashburton to Secretary of State Daniel Webster, (July 28, 1842),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp [hereinafter Ashburton
Letter].
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Within a week, U.S. Secretary of State John Forsyth wrote in protest
to Henry Stephen Fox, the British Minister in Washington.2 Fox
replied that the Caroline had been shuttling men, money, and arms to
Canadian rebels and that the attack and the Caroline’s destruction were
acts of necessary self-defense.3
The Forsyth-Fox exchange launched a four and one-half year
diplomatic, political, and judicial saga that threatened to pull the
United States, Great Britain, and Canada, into broader armed
conflict. The Caroline controversy finally came to rest during the
summer of 1842 when U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster and
British Minister in America Lord Alexander Baring Ashburton
exchanged three letters destined for legal history.4
In his first letter, Webster wrote that the Caroline attack was
“a wrong, and an offense to the sovereignty and the dignity of the
United States . . . .”5 Reiterating his comments from an earlier letter,
Webster famously placed the burden on Great Britain to show:
“[U]pon what state of facts, and what rules of national law, the
destruction of the Caroline is to be defended. It will be for that
Government to show a necessity of self-defen[s]e, instant,

2 See British-American Diplomacy: The Caroline Case, THE AVALON PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp (last visited October 30,
2013).
3 See id.
4 See Letter from Secretary of State Daniel Webster to British Minister to
the United States Lord Alexander Baring Ashburton (July 27, 1842),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp [hereinafter Webster Letter
#1]. See also Ashburton Letter, supra note 1; Letter from Secretary of State Daniel
Webster to British Minister to the United States, Lord Alexander Baring Ashburton
(Aug 6, 1842), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp [hereinafter
Webster Letter #2]. Although the final Webster-Ashburton exchange is best
known, it actually culminated a multi-author correspondence through the years
1838-1842. Others who exchanged letters throughout the Caroline affair included
Secretary of State John Forsyth, British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston, British
Minister in Washington Henry S. Fox, and American Minister to the United
Kingdom Andrew Stevenson.
5 Webster Letter #1, supra note 4.
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overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation.”6
Ashburton quickly replied, affirming that the two statesmen
were “perfectly agreed as to the general principles of international law
applicable to this unfortunate case.”7 Ashburton disagreed with
Webster, however, on the application of the principle to the facts
before them and also posed a fundamental question:
[I]f cannon are moving and setting up in a battery
which can reach you and are actually destroying life
and property by their fire, if you have remonstrated
for some time without effect and see no prospect of
relief, when begins your right to defend yourself . . . ?8
Ashburton had no doubt of the answer: the attack on the
Caroline was a necessary and justified act of self-defense.9
The Caroline letters’ lasting effect on international law has
been profound. Through their exchange, Webster and Ashburton
established a principle that has assumed an important place in the
international legal canon: a nation need not stand passively by while
another prepares to launch an attack. Their failure to agree on the
principle’s application to the facts before them, however,
foreshadowed a challenge that has vexed diplomats and scholars in
successive conflicts to this day.
One wonders if the parties in the Caroline matter might have
averted bloodshed, destruction, and affronts to national honor had
they been able to negotiate with the Caroline principle in mind before
the attack. We can only speculate. Once the water (and vessel) was
over the dam, so to speak, the parties may have been constrained by
immutable facts and found it politically difficult to compromise their
respective positions.

6
7
8
9

Id.
Ashburton Letter, supra note 1.
Id.
See id.
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While the British, Canadian, and American governments may
not have foreseen the Caroline confrontation, the same cannot be said
for diplomats involved in today’s crisis over Iran’s nuclear program.
The basic disagreement between Iran and the international
community has been well publicized: the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and United Nations Security Council have
declared Iran noncompliant with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), and Iran disagrees.10 Meanwhile, both President
Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu have declared that Iran
must not be permitted to develop a nuclear weapon, and both have
suggested that force might be used to underwrite this commitment.11
Given that most official statements and public discourse to
date have focused on the issue of Iran’s compliance with the NPT
safeguards regime, relatively little attention has been given to the legal
issues underlying the potential use of force. While no one should
confuse a 19th century dispute on the Niagara River with a 21st
century crisis over uranium enrichment in Western Asia, Caroline
provides the logical place to begin analysis. In addition to serving as
the wellspring for relevant legal doctrine, the 19th century WebsterAshburton letter exchange also provides a convenient model for
See generally Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Implementation of the
NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Rep. of the Dir. Gen., IAEA Doc. GOV/2012/55 (Nov. 16, 2012),
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2012/gov2012-55.pdf
(outlining Iran’s nuclear progress, enrichment facilities, possible military
dimensions, design information, additional protocol compliance, and other related
matters). See also Elaine Sciolino, Iran is Not Cooperating, Agency Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/28/world/middleeast/28cndiran.html?_r=3&oref=slogin&; Iran Defiant in the Face of U.N. Nuclear Sanctions,
FOREIGN
POLICY
ASSOCIATION,
Dec.
24,
2006,
http://www.fpa.org/newsletter_info2584/newsletter_info.htm (last visited Oct.
30, 2013).
11 President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013),
http://www.cspan.org/SOTU/ (“[W]e will do what is necessary to prevent them
from getting a nuclear weapon.”). Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,
Speech to joint session of U.S. Congress (May 24, 2011),
http://www.cfr.org/israel/netanyahus-address-us-congress-may-2011/p25073
(“The more Iran believes that all options are on the table, the less the chance of
confrontation . . . When we say never again, we mean never again. Israel always
reserves the right to defend itself.”).
10
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framing the current protagonists’ radically different perspectives,
both of which are critical for an informed understanding of today’s
crisis. Short of an actual public dialogue about the use of force, there
is no better way to capture the competing arguments than to imagine
a 21st century letter exchange between the United States’ Secretary of
State and the Iranian Foreign Minister.
II. A TWENTY FIRST CENTURY IMAGINED EXCHANGE
July 19, 2013
From John Kerry, Secretary of State of the United States of
America to Mohammad Javad Zarif, Foreign Minister of
the Islamic Republic of Iran:
Despite years of effort, the international community has been
unable to persuade your government to be forthcoming on critical
aspects of your uranium enrichment program. Given this impasse,
the United States must now ensure you do not misunderstand how
the international community and the United States view our vital
interests.
As always, the United States continues to seek resolution of
this matter in accord with current United Nations Security Council
resolutions and the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, which fully
account for Iran’s right to develop and operate a nuclear energy
program for peaceful purposes.12 However, absent resolution in
accordance with these agreements, we view the Iranian nuclear
program with grave concern. Your government’s willingness to flaunt
the existing international safeguards regime13 has been, and remains,
unacceptable. Today, the United States is unable to confirm the
status of either your nuclear enrichment program or any related
12 See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
13 See IAEA], Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Rep. of the Dir. Gen., ¶ 32, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/40 (June 6,
2003),
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov200340.pdf. (“Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement
with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use
of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and
processed.”).
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military development you may have undertaken. Your government
could put the world at ease simply by allowing IAEA inspectors the
access they require and have long sought. Regrettably, your
government’s actions to date are inconsistent even with agreements
you have already signed.
In the absence of such assurances, the United States is left
with no choice but to assume the Islamic Republic of Iran is
developing a nuclear weapon that may be launched without warning.
As more time passes without required access and disclosure, the
international community is increasingly threatened and options for
resolution are narrowing.
I call upon your government to comply with existing Security
Council resolutions and your obligations under the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty and related Safeguard Agreements. I am willing
to meet with you personally to discuss further details, as this may be
our last, best hope. Thank you for your attention to these concerns.
July 29, 2013
From Minister Zarif to Secretary Kerry:
Thank you for your letter. The Islamic Republic of Iran is
committed to constructive resolution of the issues between us. I
respectfully submit, however, that if there is a crisis, it is brought
about by the United States’ refusal to respect the sovereign right of
the Islamic Republic to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,
a right which is expressly permitted in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Iran might be more receptive to your concerns if they were
not so self-serving. You have nuclear weapons with enough
destructive power to destroy the world within hours. Indeed, you
provided the best evidence of their power by annihilating Hiroshima
and Nagasaki.
You seem quite willing to accept the “unacceptable” from
other nations when your interests dictate. Other nations that actually
possess nuclear weapons have not joined the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and some have even declared their intention to use nuclear
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weapons against you.14 Yet, you remain fixated on the Islamic
Republic. The government of Iran can only conclude that your
concerns arise not from your fear of nuclear weapons, but, rather,
from your fear of an assertive Islamic state.
The Islamic Republic will not be threatened or bullied. We
will continue our peaceful nuclear program without your permission,
supervision, or interference. I remain hopeful that your current
administration will walk away from the United States’ traditional
approach vis-à-vis my country. Confrontation certainly is not the
way.
August 9, 2013
Secretary Kerry to Minister Zarif:
In response to your letter of [45 days before JLIA], let me
reassure the people of Iran that the United States has no quarrel with
Islam nor any desire to interfere with a peaceful and transparent
nuclear energy program that complies with international safeguards.
You must understand, however, that Iran’s assurances alone cannot
provide the sole basis for its neighbors’ security. The following facts
are well known to you, but are recounted here to ensure there is no
doubt about why your government’s actions are viewed with such
grave concern by the entire international community.
In 2002, the IAEA substantiated allegations that the Islamic
Republic conducted secret nuclear activities. When the IAEA
requested additional access to Iran’s nuclear facilities, your
government refused. In 2007, rather than provide required disclosure,
your government announced instead that you would no longer
adhere to the Additional Protocol to your IAEA safeguards
agreement.15 Your government has consistently failed to notify the
14 See
Nuclear
Weapons:
Who
Has
What?,
CNN.COM,
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2013/03/world/nuclear-weapon-states/
(last
visited Aug. 29, 2013). See also Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, U.S. Department of
State, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/npt/(last visited Aug. 29, 2013).
15 See IAEA, supra note 10, at ¶ 49 (“Iran is not implementing its
Additional Protocol. The Agency will not be in a position to provide credible
assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran
unless and until Iran provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency . . . .”).
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IAEA of nuclear reactor design information and of your decision to
enrich uranium to 20 percent uranium-235.16 Finally, in February
2006, the IAEA Board of Governors was forced to refer the matter
of Iran’s non-compliance to the United Nations Security Council.17
Since becoming seized of the issue, the Security Council has
passed six resolutions demanding compliance with the Islamic
Republic of Iran’s IAEA safeguards agreements.18 Resolution 1696
demanded that your government suspend all enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities.19 When your government failed to comply, the
Security Council passed Resolution 1737, making IAEA compliance
mandatory and imposing sanctions that banned the supply of
nuclear-related materials and technology and froze assets of key
individuals and companies.20 These sanctions were later expanded in
four subsequent Security Council resolutions.21 In addition, the
European Union has imposed restrictions of its own.22 Finally, as a
sign of both the United States’ resolve and abiding desire to settle
this matter peacefully, our Congress passed the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA)23
in the hope that the Islamic Republic would respond sensibly.

See id. at ¶ 51.
See id. at ¶ 2 n.3.
18 See S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006); S.C. Res.
1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006); S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1803 (Mar. 3,
2008); S.C. Res. 1835, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1835 (Sept. 27, 2008); S.C. Res. 1929,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010).
19 S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006).
20 See S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006).
21 See S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res.
1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008); S.C. Res. 1835,U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1835 (Sept. 27, 2008); S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9,
2010).
22 See European Union: Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) in Force,
updated
Feb.
21,
2013,
http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf.
23 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of
2010,
Pub.
L.
No.
111-195,
124
Stat.
1312,
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ195/pdf/PLAW-111publ195.pdf.
16
17
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Your government’s record of obfuscation and delay on
nuclear matters is especially alarming in light of its recent history. The
world remembers your government’s role in the 444-day American
Embassy hostage crisis, the 1983 bombing of Marine Barracks in
Beirut that killed 299, the 1992 attack on the Israeli Embassy in
Buenos Aires that killed 29 and injured another 242, as well as its
consistent support of Hezbollah.24
Your government’s consistent refusal to abide by IAEA
regulations and U.N. Security Council Resolutions and its welldocumented history of state-sponsored terrorism provides no
confidence that Iran is enriching uranium solely for peaceful
purposes or that your government will show restraint if it acquires a
nuclear weapon.25 Iran’s conduct, both past and present, is creating
an immediate threat that, as I noted in my letter of [55 days before
JLIA], is rapidly narrowing options for resolution. Accordingly, the
United States calls on the Islamic Republic of Iran yet again to take
the required verifiable steps before it is too late.
August 19, 2013
Minister Zarif to Secretary Kerry:
The Islamic Republic cannot accept the threats implicit in
your correspondence. You lecture us about international law, but you
24 See CASEY L. ADDIS & CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R41446, HEZBOLLAH: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR
CONGRESS (2011), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41446.pdf (noting the
strong connection between Iran and Hezbollah). See also U.S. Dep’t of
Def., Report of
the
DoD Commission on Beirut International
Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/beirut1983.pdf (noting that Hezbollah is considered a terrorist organization according to
the U.S. Department of State and is on the Foreign Terrorist Organization and
Specially Designated Terrorist lists); U.S. Department of Defense, Imposition of
Sanctions With Respect to the Financial Sector of Iran, Section 1245 of the
FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act, Jan. 2012 (stating that Iran financially
supports international terrorism and proliferation).
25 See Marcus George, Iran has new rocket site, ballistic missile tests possible:
report, REUTERS, Aug. 8, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/08/usiran-space-idUSBRE9770A920130808?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews
(noting that Iran has constructed a rocket site that may be used for ballistic
missiles).
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know that a preemptive attack would be a gross violation of
international law. The United Nations Charter prohibits states from
using armed force in self-defense unless “an armed attack occurs.”26
Given that Iran has not, and will not, attack anyone first, you would
be acting illegally in express violation of the Charter. Your own
scholars have said as much.27
Furthermore, the International Court of Justice has ruled that
the mere possession of nuclear weapons does not violate the Charter
or general principles of international law.28 Thus, even if Iran did
possess nuclear weapons, any attack would be blatant aggression.
As a peace-loving nation, Iran hopes you will abandon any
further consideration of an illegal, immoral, and foolish preemptive
strike.
August 29, 2013
Secretary Kerry to Minister Zarif:
I am encouraged by your mention of international law. If we
act within international law, our chances for a satisfactory solution
increase. Our discussion of international law must, however, be
accurate and complete. Article 51 simply reaffirmed the right nations
already possessed: the inherent right of self-defense. Article 51
includes not only the right to respond to an armed attack, but also the

See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (stating: “All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). See also U.N. Charter art. 51 (stating:
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed occurs against a Member of the United
Nations . . . .”).
27 See Mary Ellen O’Connell & Maria Alveras-Chen, The Ban on the Bomb–
And Bombing: Iran, the U.S., and the International Law of Self-Defense, 57 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 497, 497 (2007) (“The use of force [against Iran] should ‘come off the table,’
as diplomats search for a constructive way forward.”).
28 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
26
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inherent right to prevent an imminent attack.29 A nation’s right to
defend itself through preventative measures is well established when
circumstances present an immediate threat and no alternative means
are available for guaranteeing the safety of its people or territorial
integrity. Your ability to launch a nuclear weapon at a regional target
without detection would present such a threat to our allies as well as
U.S. citizens and property lawfully in the region.
September 9, 2013
Minister Zarif to Secretary Kerry:
Your position on the preemptive use of force is intriguing,
particularly given that the Islamic Republic has lived in the shadow of
nuclear weapons, most notably those possessed by the United States
and Israel, for many years. If Iran were so inclined, we could apply
your criteria as justification to strike each of your nations. Obviously,
we have not.
Iran would never execute a policy that has already been
deemed illegal by the international community. Have you forgotten
how the United States, and the rest of the world, condemned Israel’s
attack on the Iraqi nuclear program in 1981?30 Have you forgotten
the 2005 World Summit, where the General Assembly, including the
United States, reaffirmed the Charter’s text and with it, the principle
that unilateral first use of force outside the express text of the
Charter is not permitted?31

The French text of Article 51 refers to “le droit naturel,” that is, “the
natural right.” Charte des Nations Unies art. 51. This is a very expansive view of
preemptive action, permitting more preemptive attacks than the U.N. Charter.
30 See S.C. Res. 487, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (Jun. 19, 1981) (stating
that the Security Council “strongly condemns the military attack by Israel in clear
violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international
conduct . . . .”).
31 See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 79, U.N. Doc
A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005) (stating: “We reaffirm that the relevant provisions of
the Charter are sufficient to address the full range of threats to international peace
and security. We further reaffirm the authority of the Security Council to mandate
coercive action to maintain and restore international peace and security. We stress
the importance of acting in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
29
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Likewise, Iran would never execute a policy that is based on
so many flawed premises. Preemptive attacks rely on suppositions,
which, in turn, depend on information and intelligence that may be
wrong. Recall how your country invaded Iraq based on the false
intelligence that Iraq posed “a continuing threat to the national
security of the United States [by] continuing to possess and develop
significant chemical and biological weapons.”32 Recall how your
predecessor, General Colin Powell, lectured the United Nations
Security Council in 2003, claiming that Saddam Hussein was
concealing weapons of mass destruction.33 As the world has since
learned, your information was either grossly mistaken or deliberately
misleading. In either case, your misplaced invasion led to needless
suffering and death. Your calamity in Iraq shows the folly of
substituting paranoia and deception for actual facts.
For all these reasons, Iran will never attack first, and we
categorically deny your right to do so. Iran has shown discipline and
patience in the face of an actual, as opposed to imaginary, threat. Iran
has chosen the path of peace over the path of mob violence.
However, do not be mistaken: the Islamic Republic will defend itself
if you are so foolish as to launch an armed attack first. Your bombers
will fall from the sky, your ships will sink, and your sailors and
soldiers will die. If the deaths of your young people are an
insufficient deterrent, know also you will watch your gas lines grow,
your freeways lie empty, and your fading economy wither even more
quickly. Most ironically, your attack will be wasted because our
nuclear facilities are invulnerable. If you attack them, you will fail.
September 13, 2013
Secretary Kerry to Minister Zarif:
Your most recent letter is deeply disappointing. Even so,
because the stakes are so high, I invite you, on behalf of the President
Charter.”) This is important as Article 51 of the U.N. Charter only permits military
action in self-defense “if an armed attack occurs.”
32 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498.
33 Colin Powell, U.S. Sec’y of State, Presentation to the U.N. Security
Council
on
the
U.S.
Case
Against
Iraq
(Feb.
6,
2003),
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.transcript.
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of the United States, to meet with me in Geneva as soon as possible
to continue this discussion. I extend this offer in good faith and in
the sincere hope that we might yet find a way to preserve the peace. I
look forward to your reply.34
III. ASSESSING THE EXCHANGE
Aside from demonstrating that “fantasy diplomacy” is as
intractable as real diplomacy, who has the better legal argument?35
As the imagined Zarif letter suggests, some international
lawyers would argue that nothing would justify a preemptive strike on
Iranian nuclear capabilities.36 They argue that possession of nuclear
34 See Thomas Erdbrink, Iran’s New President Calls for Nuclear Talks Without
Rejecting
Direct
U.S.
Role,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
6
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/07/world/middleeast/irans-new-presidentsays-nuclear-talks-could-succeed.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=0 (noting that
Iran’s new President, Hassan Rouhani, has called for serious negotiations with the
United States on Iran’s nuclear program but calling for the United States to take the
first step).
35 Some contend that legal arguments contribute little to the use of force
debate. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L.
REV. 699, 717 (2005) (“[Some] see the rules on the use of force embedded in the
[U.N.] Charter as completely devoid of any legally significant normative value.”).
See also Jeremy Rabkin, American Self-Defense Shouldn’t Be Too Distracted by International
Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 31, 43 (“When one appeals to higher claims . . .
one should keep in mind that among the very highest claims is the claim of the
people to security.”).
36 See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE, 199,
para. 525 (5th ed. 2011) (“U.N. Member States are barred by the Charter from
exercising self-defense[] in response to a mere threat of force”). See also THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1422, para. 50 (Bruno
Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012) (“[A]n anticipatory right of self-defence would be
contrary to the wording of Art. 51 (‘if an armed attack occurs’). . .”); Rep. of the
U.N. Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A
more secure world: Our shared responsibility, ¶ 190, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004),
http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf (“I]f there are good arguments for
preventative military action, with good evidence to support them, they should be
put to the Security Council, which can authorize such action if it chooses to.”);
Murphy, supra note 35, at 708 (stating that some “hew[] closely to the language of
Article 51. . . . Neither anticipatory self-defense nor preemptive self-defense can be
lawful because such forms of self-defense envisage action prior to an armed attack
actually occurring.”).
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weapons, per se, does not violate international law, that the U.N.
Charter permits the use of force only in response to an armed attack,
and, that the Security Council (including the United States) has
condemned past acts of preemption against nuclear programs. Within
this view, force is permitted only if Iran launches a nuclear attack;
although, some may acknowledge the necessity of preemptive force
in rare circumstances. Concerned that endorsing any aspect of the
preemption doctrine would encourage its use, this group would ban
the first use of force but rely on the international community to judge
the circumstances of an attack in hindsight, and impose severe or
minimal sanctions as appropriate.37
Another group, in the Webster-Ashburton tradition, would
allow anticipatory force against an enemy who is clearly preparing to
attack. This view requires evidence that the attack be “imminent,”
i.e., that the potential target state demonstrates that its adversary is
making tangible preparations to attack and that the only way to
prevent the impending attack is to damage or destroy the adversary’s
capability to launch the attack.38
Despite the differences in these legal positions, neither
position would justify an attack on Iran today.39 As the imagined
Kerry letters suggest, these legal restrictions leave some uneasy,
including the actual leaders of the United States and Israel. To the
extent the Obama Administration has discussed the issue publicly,
official statements have described the potential Iranian threat not as
“imminent,” but “existential.”40 While “existential” has not been
See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 310-11, quoted in
Murphy, supra note 35, at 711.
38 See Murphy, supra note 35, at 711-15.
39 See Cristian DeFrancia, Enforcing The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: The
Legality of Preventative Measures, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 705, 780 (2012) (“The
concept of an ‘imminent’ attack remains confined in nineteenth century
conceptions, as articulated in the Caroline case.”). See also Gregory E. Maggs, How
the United States Might Justify a Preemptive Strike on a Rogue Nation’s Nuclear Weapon
Development Facilities under the U.N. Charter, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 465, 476-78 (2007)
(arguing that the Caroline case does not justify an attack on nuclear capabilities).
40 See Ron Kampeas, Obama Tells U.N.: Nuclear Iran poses existential threat to
Israel,
JTA
(Sept.
25,
2012,
3:24
PM),
http://www.jta.org/news/article/2012/09/25/3107926/obama-nuclear-iran37
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precisely defined in this context,41 it seems intended to capture the
increased diplomatic leverage a nuclear-armed Iran would enjoy as
well as the possibility that Iran might feel emboldened to act more
aggressively, either directly or as a state-sponsor, under cover of a
nuclear umbrella.
As unsettling as the proposal of a nuclear-armed Iran may be,
a hostile state’s possession of nuclear weapons capability has never
been sufficiently threatening, per se, to prompt a preemptive armed
attack by an opposing state. Aside from Israel’s strikes on Iraq and
Syria, which elicited varying degrees of condemnation from the
international community,42 the closest example is the U.S. blockade
of Cuba (or “quarantine,” as it was called) during the Cuban Missile
Crisis. These events contrast with decades of restraint by the Soviet
Union and the United States vis-à-vis each other, as well as other
mutual adversaries confirmed or believed to have nuclear weapons.
To date, the Obama Administration has done little to compare or
distinguish these precedents.

poses-existential-threat-to-israel (quoting President Obama as saying, “Make no
mistake, a nuclear-armed Iran is not a challenge that can be contained. It would
threaten the elimination of Israel, the security of Gulf nations and the stability of
the global economy.”). See also Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action Against
Iran,
THE
IRAN
PROJECT
42
(Sept.
13,
2012),
http://www.scribd.com/doc/106806148/IranReport-092412-Final#fullscreen
(noting that Prime Minister Netanyahu describes a nuclear-capable Iran as an
“existential threat” and many members of the U.S. Congress and other political
leaders agree with the Israeli position); Ivo H. Daalder, Beyond Preemption: An
Overview, in BEYOND PREEMPTION: FORCE AND LEGITIMACY IN A CHANGING
WORLD 1, 8 (Ivo H. Daalder ed., 2007) (stating “the very possession of weapons of
mass destruction by some countries can pose an existential threat, whether or not
their actual use is truly imminent.”).
41 Israel typically defines “existential” as meaning a threat to Israel as a
nation-state.
42 Israel’s attack on the Iraqi facilities at Orisak was widely condemned.
See supra note 30. But see Andrew Garwood-Gowers, Israel’s Airstrikes on Syria’s AlKibar Facility: A Test Case for the Doctrine of Pre-emptive Self-Defence?, 16 J. CONFLICT &
SECURITY L. 263, 290 (2011) (“Israel’s failure to offer any legal justification for its
airstrike, and the muted international reaction to the Al-Kibar episode, appear to be
part of a recent trend in state practice indicating a broader lack of concern over the
legality of relatively minor uses of force.”).
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To be fair, the timing is not good for the Obama
Administration to engage in detailed justifications for using force
against Iran. In addition to the potentially toxic effect such discussion
might have on ongoing negotiations, it could highlight potential
differences between the United States and Israel regarding the
appropriate threshold for using preemptive force, undermining
whatever deterrent value the current vaguely defined threat may
provide. In addition, there are undoubtedly military and intelligence
capability issues the Obama Administration is unwilling to discuss
publicly. Reticence is understandable, at least for the moment.
Ultimately, however, if anticipatory self-defense as traditionally
understood is insufficient to protect against the “existential” Iranian
threat, the President might reasonably be expected to offer a more
precise rationale and afford Congress the opportunity to consider the
issue as well.
Even if the Iranian crisis abates, questions surrounding the
use of preemptive force against weapons of mass destruction are
likely to persist, and any complete analysis will implicate three
fundamental questions. First, does a state or non-state actor have the
capability to use a nuclear weapon? Second, does the potential
nuclear actor have a strong propensity to use the weapon? Third, at
what point does a potential target state lose its capability to prevent
the weapon’s use?
The answers to each of these questions have important
implications for the use of preemptive force, and traditional Caroline
analysis has tended to focus predominantly on the first two. If an
actor has the capability to use force, then the actor’s intent becomes
critical. In traditional conflict scenarios, knowing an actor’s intent
may be difficult, but the limited destructive capacity of the actor’s
capability will often make erring on the side of caution an acceptable
risk. To a large degree, traditional international law adopts this
approach.43 However, when the capability portends mass destruction,
the risk calculation changes and the third factor above becomes
especially relevant.

See Barry E. Carter & Allen S. Weiner, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 9311083 (6th ed. 2011).
43
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In the contemporary Iranian context, the third question is
this: given the ultimate difficulty of knowing Iranian intent, at what
point does Iran’s capability to deliver a weapon of mass destruction
exceed the United States’ or Israel’s capability to prevent the weapon’s
use? Given uncertainty about both Iran’s intent and capability, when
does the United States or Israeli capability-based window of
prevention close, thereby creating an unacceptable risk given the first
two uncertainties?
This question raises a series of subordinate questions. For
example, will a potential target state know where an attack will
originate? If yes, will the target state know when the attack will
originate? If yes, will the target state have sufficient reaction time to
respond? If yes, will the target state have sufficient capability of its
own to respond? If the answer to each of these questions is
confidently and consistently yes, then the justification for a
preemptive strike is presumably reduced. The potential target state
can wait, Caroline style, for indications that a real-time attack is about
to begin and put a stop to it.
If, however, the answer to any of the questions above is
something less than a confident and consistent yes, are policymakers
in the potential target state required to rest and accept the risk that an
adversary will be able to launch an attack that cannot be stopped? If
the answer is yes, then the inquiry ends. If, however, the answer is
no, and we are unwilling to mandate that states (and their inhabitants)
accept the resulting risk, we must challenge the classic understanding
of self-defense and revisit Caroline.
IV. REVISITING CAROLINE
Revisiting Caroline in the context of Iran’s alleged pursuit of
nuclear weapons requires another series of questions. If a potential
target state is not confident in its ability to prevent a possible nuclear
weapons attack, is it at least confident in its ability to locate and
destroy a weapon after it has been created but before an attack
sequence is imminent. If so, then a revised Caroline doctrine might
justify a preemptive strike on the weapon itself. If, however, the
potential target state lacks confidence in its ability to destroy the
weapon in its crib, is the target state able to prevent the weapon from
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being built by stopping or impeding development of one or more of
its critical components, i.e., the fissile material, the nuclear trigger, or
the delivery system? If so, is this the last, best, objective chance to
ensure a nuclear attack will not occur? Is this where the potential
nuclear aggressor’s activities are best illuminated and least dangerous?
If so, should a potential target state be permitted to take action
before this window of maximum insight and minimal danger closes?
Asking these questions in the current Iranian context does
not assume the answers. The United States or Israel may well have
the ability to prevent Iran’s “imminent” use of a nuclear weapon as
imminence is understood in the traditional Caroline context. If a
potential target state has confidence that it can destroy the weapon
immediately before launch, then the potential target state ought
arguably to wait for that moment to give transparency or
disarmament the fullest opportunity. If, however, an earlier
preemptive attack is the last realistic chance before the preemption
window closes, should international law deny the right to use
preemptive force?44
There are a host of potential responses. Diplomacy may be
more effective if states do not have a sanctioned “off ramp” to use
force; states operating in bad faith may manipulate a preemptive
right;45 and, states operating in good faith may make honest mistakes
about the other side’s intentions or capabilities. Each of these
responses is plausible, but none answers the ultimate question: what
does a nation do, after negotiating unsuccessfully and in good faith,
to defend itself or an ally against a catastrophic threat its elected
leaders reasonably and honestly believe may occur?
In the age of terror and potential mass destruction, the
answer cannot be to negotiate tirelessly, accept the risk, and hope for
44 Cf. Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action Against Iran, supra note 40,
at 42, 8, 29 (concluding that the United States would have at least a month to make
a military decision once Iran makes a “dash for the bomb” and that a military strike
would delay Iran’s ability to build a nuclear weapon “for up to four years”).
45 See 1986: U.S. Launches Air Strikes on Libya, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/15/newsid_3975000/397
5455.stm (noting that the 1986 Libya incident was an instance of one state
provoking the threat and then used it to justify the exercise of force).
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the best. Likewise, the answer cannot be to ignore international law:
to assume that the United States may impose its will oblivious to
both the constraints and legitimizing power of international law in
the 21st century is naïve and dangerous. Ultimately, however, a ban
on preemptive action—however aspirational and legally pristine—
does not meet the needs of officials charged with protecting actual
populations.46 International legal theory notwithstanding, an official
facing a perceived threat that poses an unacceptable risk will act to
defeat it.47 In light of this reality, is it not preferable to provide criteria
See, e.g., President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Address to
the American People on the Soviet Arms Build-up in Cuba (Oct. 22, 1962),
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/sUVmCh-sB0moLfrBcaHaSg.aspx (“We
no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a
sufficient challenge to a nation’s security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear
weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially
increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may
well be regarded as a definite threat to peace”). See also Transcript of the Interview
at the World Economic Forum in Davos, The Clinton Foundation, January 27,
2005,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SLqEQyyVNzI&t=1658
(quoting
President Clinton: “Everybody talks about what the Israelis did at Osirak in 1981,
which, I think, in retrospect, was a really good thing. You know, it kept Saddam
from developing nuclear power”); THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 13-16 (2002),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf (claiming that the
President must prevent nations that assist terrorists from possessing nuclear
weapons). This position was reiterated in: WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2006).
47 See Daniel Joyner, Jus Ad Bellum In The Age of WMD Proliferation, 40
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 233, 247 (2008) (“[A]t the heart of the current crisis in
international use of force law is a continuing, and likely increasing gap between the
provisions of existing law and the perceptions of a significant number of important
states of realities of the international political issue area that law is meant to
regulate - a classic gap between law and reality caused by the law simply lagging
behind the dynamics of technological and geo-political change.”). See also Daniel
Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors,
106 AM. J. INT’L L. 770, 773 (2012) (“There is little intersection between the
academic debate and the operational realities. . . . The reality of the threats, the
consequences of inaction, and the challenges of . . . operational decision making in
the face of such threats frequently trump a doctrinal debate that has yet to produce
a clear set of principles that effectively address the specific operational
circumstances faced by states. This situation is unsatisfactory. Particularly in this
area of law, it is important that principle is sensitive to the practical realities of the
circumstances that it addresses . . . .”) Sir Daniel Bethlehem QC was the former
46
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to guide decision-making before conflict occurs? If conflict does
occur, is it not preferable to have criteria available to enhance the
objectivity, and thereby, the credibility of post-hoc accountability
assessments? To deny the right of preemptive self-defense is to create
a dangerous vacuum: a legal doctrine so restrictive that nations
cannot realistically comply creates a category of potential actions that
are prospectively ungoverned and retrospectively standard-less.
It is easier to justify a right to preemption in theory than to
develop a set of workable criteria upon which to measure whether a
particular use of force is justified. This difficulty, however, should not
deter continued attempts to perfect preemptive criteria. Sir Daniel
Bethlehem and Professor Matthew Waxman have made recent,
substantial efforts in this regard. Bethlehem stresses factors such as:
. . .(a) the nature and immediacy of the threat, (b) the
probability of an attack, (c) whether the anticipated
attack is part of a concerted pattern of continuing
armed activity, (d) the likely scale of the attack and
injury, loss, or damage likely to result therefrom in the
absence of mitigating action, and (e) the likelihood
that there will be other opportunities to undertake
effective action in self-defense. . .48
Professor Waxman notes factors such as the exhaustion of peaceful
alternatives, the unacceptable risk of losing the opportunity to
eradicate the threat, the magnitude of the threat, and the consistency
with the purposes of the U.N. Charter.49

principal legal advisor of the U.K. Foreign & Commonwealth Office from May
2006 to May 2011; ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 242 (1994) (“[I]n a nuclear age, common sense cannot
require one to interpret an ambiguous provision in a text in a way that requires a
state passively to accept its fate before it can defend itself.”); Matthew C. Waxman,
The Use of Force Against States That Might Have Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 1, 49 (2009) (“The vitality of the law governing precautionary self-defense
is dependent upon the ability of this law to adapt to contemporary challenges. . . .
in a manner that decision-makers and security professionals perceive as sensible.”).
48 See Bethlehem, supra note 47, at 775.
49 See Waxman, supra note 47, at 28.
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An obvious place to start, and possibly develop the
preemption criteria, is with the parties who hold the information
indispensable for resolving disputes: the state and non-state actors
who raise suspicions about their capabilities and intentions through
their failure to cooperate with transparency regimes. Here too, a host
of objections might be raised. To begin, the NPT allows countries to
develop nuclear energy and then withdraw to build weapons; does
not require the big five nations to reduce their nuclear weapons;50 and
has no mechanisms to enforce and penalize nations for withdrawing
or violating the treaty. One might add to the list the inherent
difficulty of a suspected state proving a negative.
Regardless how one evaluates these particular objections to
the status quo, the international community must do more to resolve
the standoff between states who violate international transparency
standards and states contemplating the use of preemptive force
against those potentially in possession of weapons of mass
destruction.51 A party’s violation of rigorously vetted transparency
norms—whether status quo or progressively developed in the
future—should be expressly included in the calculation of revised
Caroline criteria.
When Daniel Webster and Lord Ashburton were making
legal history through their exchange of letters, ships were built from
wood, combatants wore uniforms, and lethality was measured by the
range of a smooth bore cannon shot. The world has changed. When
diplomacy fails in the current era—one characterized by terrorism,
non-state actors, and the potential for mass destruction—nations
must have legal authority to remove threats before they are fulfilled.
Preemptive actions must be governed by criteria carefully drawn to
Although the NPT does not require reductions of nuclear weapons
from the big five nation signatories, Article VI encourages them to actively
consider making such moves. (“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effect international control.”).
51 See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 27, at 498 (“Iran is obligated under
international law to comply with Council resolutions. By the same token, those
states concerned with Iran’s nuclear program must also comply with international
law and its prohibition on the use of force in how they respond to Iran.”).
50
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redefine our understanding of Caroline’s “no choice of means, no
moment for deliberation,”52 in the face of the extraordinary risks
posed by weapons of mass destruction in the age of terror.
The development of a set of preemption criteria is difficult
but essential. To say otherwise means the law remains silent in the
face of a potentially dangerous actor who would develop, possess,
and possibly use a massively destructive weapon. Until states like Iran
are willing to offer more cooperation in demonstrating they are not
“actual” threats, such states can expect others to consider them
“existential” threats with the risk that entails for all concerned.
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